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Abstract
The New Keynesian theory of inflation determination is tested in this paper by means of
laboratory experiments. We find that the Taylor principle is a necessary condition to ensure
convergence to the inflation target, but it is not sufficient. Using a behavioral model of
expectation formation, we show how heterogeneous expectations tend to self-organize on
different forecasting strategies depending on monetary policy. Finally, we link the central
bank ability to control inflation to the impact that monetary policy has on the type of
feedback –positive or negative– between expectations and realizations of aggregate variables
and in turn on the composition of subjects with respect to the type of forecasting rules they
use.
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1. Introduction1
The recent literature on inflation dynamics has questioned the ability of the “Taylor2
principle” to uniquely pin down the inflation path in the baseline rational expectations3
(RE) New Keynesian (NK) model (see Cochrane (2011) among others). The aim of the4
present paper is to shed new light on this debate by means of laboratory experiments and5
to empirically test for the effectiveness of the Taylor principle as a device to pin down6
∗Corresponding author: C.H.Hommes@uva.nl, +31(0)205254246, Valckenierstraat 65, 1018 XE Amster-
dam.
Preprint submitted to Elsevier November 7, 2018
inflation. The advantage of an experimental approach is that no a-priori assumption needs7
to be placed on agents’ beliefs. Instead, expectations are directly elicited from incentivized8
human subjects participating in the experiment.9
In NK models under rational expectations, inflation control is obtained through mone-10
tary policy satisfying the “Taylor principle” (see e.g. Woodford, 2003). When the nominal11
interest rate reacts more than one-for-one to deviations of inflation from its target, there ex-12
ists a unique non-explosive equilibrium path, also labeled as “forward-stable” (FS) solution13
(Garc´ıa-Schmidt and Woodford, 2015). The FS-RE solution is then typically selected as the14
one determining inflation dynamics in the model.15
Cochrane (2011), however, shows that there exist other RE solutions that cannot be16
ruled out by any transversality condition or economic principle. Although the Taylor princi-17
ple holds, these “non-fundamental” (NF) solutions (Evans and McGough, 2018) are explosive18
and satisfy all relevant equilibrium conditions. The existence of NF-RE and the ability of19
the Taylor principle to pin down uniquely inflation dynamics are at the root of the debate20
on inflation control, surveyed in Section 2. Given the strong linkage, in the NK framework,21
between inflation dynamics and inflation expectations, the focus has shifted on the ability of22
central banks to manage expectations via Taylor rules. The literature has then investigated23
the role of expectation formation in shaping inflation dynamics by considering mild depar-24
tures from RE (see e.g. McCallum, 2009; Garc´ıa-Schmidt and Woodford, 2015; Farhi and25
Werning, 2017; Gabaix, 2018; Evans and McGough, 2018; Mankiw and Reis, 2002; Coibion26
and Gorodnichenko, 2015; Angeletos and Lian, 2018, among others) In this paper we do not27
impose a-priori the type of expectations, and let them be directly elicited from participants28
in the experiment. Therefore, an advantage of our approach is that we can study the Taylor29
principle without taking a stand on the form of expectations.30
In our experiment subjects are asked to forecast inflation and the output gap in an ar-31
tificial NK economy and their rewards depend solely on the accuracy of these forecasts.32
Forecasts are then aggregated and used as inputs into a computerized NK model, which33
describes realizations of inflation and the output gap as functions of such forecasts and ex-34
2
ogenous disturbances.1 This process then repeats itself for a fixed number of periods. Our35
experimental economic systems are therefore “self-referential” (Marcet and Sargent, 1989) in36
the sense that expectations affect the data-generating process, which in turn affects expec-37
tations. As noted by Eusepi and Preston (2018), expectation errors in such environments,38
characterized by a dynamic feedback between expectations and realizations of aggregate vari-39
ables, may propagate through the system, becoming self-fulfilling and causing instability. We40
use this setup to investigate whether the FS-RE solution emerges as the equilibrium out-41
come in the experimental economies under different monetary policy regimes by considering42
different parameterizations of a Taylor-type interest rate rule.43
Our contribution is threefold. First, we establish that Cochrane’s results on multiplicity44
of equilibria, do not only emerge in rational or near rational expectations settings. We also45
find them in a set up in which expectations are elicited from human subjects participating46
in the experiment. In other words, we reinforce Cochrane’s results finding that the Taylor47
principle is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for stability and uniqueness of the equi-48
librium path of inflation. Second, we revisit Cochrane’s results and reframe them in terms49
of positive versus negative expectation feedbacks. In particular, we show that the conditions50
for the emergence of a FS-RE solution relate to the existence of strong enough negative51
feedbacks.2 Third, we show that in a heterogeneous expectations setting the convergence52
to a stable equilibrium is driven by a composition effect. More precisely, convergence to a53
stable equilibrium obtains when the share of agents adopting an adaptive expectation rule is54
large enough. A direct policy implication of this result is that the central bank can actually55
achieve convergence by managing the share of agents using a specific expectation rule. We56
show that this can be implemented by manipulating the relative size of the negative feedback57
by tuning the reaction of the policy rule to deviations of inflation from its target. In other58
words, the central bank can manage the composition of expectation rules adopted by agents,59
1Aggregate outcomes computed in our laboratory economies are consistent with the notion of “temporary
equilibria” in the sense that they result from first-order conditions of (computerized) households and firms
given subjects’ forecasts (see e.g. Garc´ıa-Schmidt and Woodford, 2015; Farhi and Werning, 2017; Eusepi and
Preston, 2018).
2Negative (positive) expectations feedback means that the average forecast has a negative (positive)
effect on the realized aggregate variable.
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and achieve convergence to the target, by implementing an aggressive monetary policy that60
in turn increases the “size” of the negative feedback.61
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates our work to the existing literature,62
presents the theoretical framework and describes different monetary policy regimes. Section 363
describes the design of the experiment and shows the experimental results. Section 4 presents64
the model used to explain self-organization of individual expectations and the emergence of65
aggregate behaviors observed in the experiment. This section also discusses how the central66
bank can influence this process through monetary policy in order to achieve convergence to67
the target equilibrium. Section 5 concludes.68
2. Related literature69
The aim of this section is twofold. First, we describe the theoretical framework that we70
use in the experiment and second, we place it in the debate about inflation control via Taylor71
rules within the NK model.72
In the following we adopt the standard New Keynesian workhorse model described by373
yt = y¯
e
t+1 − ϕ(it − p¯iet+1 − γ) + gt (1)74
pit = λyt + ρp¯i
e
t+1 + ut (2)75
it = Max{p¯i + γ + φpi(pit − p¯i), 0} . (3)76
Eq. (1) is the dynamic IS curve, Eq. (2) is the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) and77
Eq. (3) is the monetary policy rule, with a zero lower bound (ZLB), implemented by the78
monetary authority in order to keep inflation at its target value p¯i. Variables yt and y¯
e
t+179
denote respectively the actual and average expected output gap, it is the nominal interest80
rate, pit and p¯i
e
t+1 denote respectively the actual and average expected inflation rates, p¯i is the81
inflation target. Parameter ϕ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption,82
3Micro-founded NK models consistent with heterogeneous expectations have been derived by Branch and
McGough (2009), Kurz et al. (2013), Massaro (2013) and Woodford (2013). System (1) – (3) corresponds
to the model developed by Branch and McGough (2009) augmented with demand and supply shocks, or to
the model derived in Kurz et al. (2013) in which deviations of average agents’ forecasts of individual future
consumption (prices) from average forecast of aggregate consumption (price) enter the error terms.
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λ denotes the slope of the NKPC, ρ is the discount factor, γ is the natural interest rate.83
The coefficient φpi measures the response of the nominal interest rate it to deviations of the84
inflation rate pit from its target p¯i. Finally and gt and ut are exogenous disturbances, which85
can be thought of a demand shock and a cost push shock respectively. When the ZLB is not86
binding, by substituting for the monetary policy rule in Eq. (3), the model (1) – (3) can be87
reduced to a two variables system and written in matrix form as:88
zt = A + M z¯
e
t+1 + C t , (4)89
where z = (y, pi)′ is the vector of endogenous variables, z¯e = (y¯e, p¯ie)′ is the vector of average90
forecasts and  = (g, u)′ is the vector of exogenous disturbances.4 When expectations are91
rational and the Taylor principle is satisfied (φpi > 1), the model admits a FS-RE solution92
of the form:93
zt = Θ
FS + Ct , (5)94
with ΘFS = (I −M)−1A, while the form of matrix C depends on the assumptions placed95
on the observability of the shocks. However, Cochrane (2011) argues that, in the context of96
NK models, the Taylor principle does not eliminate equilibrium indeterminacy. In particular97
there exists a NF-RE solution of the form:98
zt = Θ
NF + ΦNF zt−1 + Ct , (6)99
with ΘNF = (−M)−1A, and ΦNF = M−1, while the form of matrix C depends on the100
assumptions placed on the observability of the shocks.101
McCallum (2009) argues that a necessary condition for a RE equilibrium to be considered102
as representative of aggregate behavior in actual economies, is that agents should be able to103
learn this equilibrium from data generated by the economy itself. On these grounds, McCal-104
4Coefficient matrices A, M and C are defined as follows:
A ≡
(
ϕp¯i(φpi−1)
1+λϕφpi
λϕp¯i(φpi−1)
1+λϕφpi
)
, M ≡
(
1
1+λϕφpi
ϕ(1−φpiρ)
1+λϕφpi
λ
1+λϕφpi
λϕ+ρ
1+λϕφpi
)
, C ≡
(
1
1+λϕφpi
−ϕφpi
1+λϕφpi
λ
1+λϕφpi
1
1+λϕφpi
)
.
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lum proposes “least-squares learnability” as an equilibrium selection device and shows that,105
when the Taylor principle is satisfied, the NK model with least-squares learning converges to106
the FS-RE equilibrium. Cochrane (2009) objects to the results derived in McCallum (2009)107
on the grounds that they hinge on observability of contemporaneous exogenous shocks. This108
assumption is indeed hard to defend for the relevant exogenous shocks in the NK model,109
e.g. aggregate productivity, preference or monetary policy shocks. Evans and McGough110
(2018) extend the results of McCallum (2009) to the case of unobservable shocks. In this111
case NF-RE solutions are never learnable, while the FS-RE equilibrium is learnable provided112
that the positive feedback from expectations to realizations of the endogenous variable being113
forecast is not too large, as in the case of a NK model satisfying the Taylor principle.114
Our paper is directly related to this debate. In particular, our evaluation of the effec-115
tiveness of the Taylor principle for inflation determinacy is consistent with the principle put116
forward in McCallum (2009) and Evans and McGough (2018): subjects have imperfect infor-117
mation about the exact functioning of the economy they are participating in, but they can118
nevertheless learn the RE equilibrium through properly designed monetary policy. There119
are however some important differences. The first obvious difference with the least-squares120
learnability approach is that we do not postulate any learning mechanism, having instead121
real human subjects learning in the experimental economies. The second difference concerns122
the information set available to learning agents. In fact, contrarily to McCallum (2009)123
and Evans and McGough (2018), contemporaneous realizations of aggregate variables are124
not available to subjects when forecasting future inflation and output gap.5 This assump-125
tion addresses the simultaneity issue raised by Cochrane (2009), i.e. how to interpret an126
equilibrium in which agents are forecasting based on the same endogenous variables being127
determined. Our conclusions regarding the effectiveness of the Taylor principle differ from128
those obtained under least-squares learning since we find that the Taylor principle is not a129
sufficient condition to ensure convergence to the FS-RE equilibrium.130
Given the strong linkage in the NKPC between expectations and inflation dynamics,131
5In our experimental implementation we consider unobservable IID exogenous disturbances with zero
mean. Moreover, since realizations of endogenous variables zt in period t depend on expectations z
e
t+1 formed
in period t, subjects in the experiment do not observe contemporaneous variables when making forecasts.
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the role of beliefs formation has been widely investigated. Garc´ıa-Schmidt and Woodford132
(2015) have developed the concept of “reflective equilibrium”. In particular, they posit a133
continuous belief revision process in which, given a conjecture about average forecasts, agents134
refine expectations using their knowledge of the structural equations governing the economy.135
In this framework issues of indeterminacy are sidestepped as, for a given level of reflection,136
the equilibrium outcome is unique. Moreover, when the Taylor principle is satisfied, the137
dynamics of the NK model under the reflective process converge to the FS-RE solution as the138
degree of reflection increases. Farhi and Werning (2017) adopt a form of bounded rationality139
based on a discrete deductive procedure rather than continuous, known as “level-k thinking”140
(see Nagel, 1995). Within the context of a NK model with incomplete markets, they show141
that the level-k equilibrium converges to the RE with complete markets as k increases only142
when the Taylor principle is satisfied. The main difference between our approach and both143
the “reflective” and “level-k thinking” is that the latter assume an iterative reasoning based144
on knowledge by agents of the correct quantitative specification of the economic structure,145
while our subjects have imperfect structural knowledge of the economy. Our experimental146
results show that, even without full information, monetary policy can ensure coordination147
on the FS-RE equilibrium.148
Gabaix (2018) introduces partially myopic agents and shows that, if bounded rationality149
is strong enough, the NK model exhibits a unique bounded equilibrium even without the150
Taylor principle. Angeletos and Lian (2018) study the effect of monetary policy focusing151
on the forward guidance puzzle in a NK model with full rationality and informational fric-152
tions, showing how the absence of common knowledge may rationalize the kind of myopia153
postulated in Gabaix (2018). Mankiw and Reis (2002) propose a framework in which agents154
receive perfect information infrequently due to slow diffusion of information. In a framework155
with imperfectly informed firms, Barrdear (2018) shows that a unique bounded equilibrium156
emerges in the NK model regardless of whether the Taylor principle is satisfied. Our exper-157
imental findings show instead that the Taylor principle is a necessary, though not sufficient,158
condition to observe convergence to the FS-RE equilibrium. In this paper, contrary to this159
literature, we do not posit a priori a specific form of expectations, instead we rely on labo-160
ratory experiments to elicit them (see Section 3). By doing so we do not restrict ourself to a161
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particular beliefs theory. In this respect our paper relates to the literature on macro experi-162
ments in controlled laboratory environments, (see Duffy, 2016, for a recent overview). Our163
experiment is a Learning-to-Forecast Experiment (LtFE), a design first proposed by Mari-164
mon and Sunder (1993) to study expectations dynamics in the laboratory. In recent years a165
number of LtFEs have been conducted within the NK framework to investigate inflation per-166
sistence (Adam, 2007), disinflationary policies (Cornand and M’baye, 2016), the importance167
of the expectation channel for macroeconomic stabilization (Kryvtsov and Petersen, 2013),168
and monetary and fiscal policy design at the zero lower bound (Arifovic and Petersen, 2017;169
Hommes et al., 2018) among other topics. Most closely related to our paper is Pfajfar and170
Z˘akelj (2018), who study the stabilization effects of different monetary policy rules by means171
of LtFEs. Pfajfar and Z˘akelj (2018) compare inflation variability under contemporaneous vs.172
forward-looking interest rate rules all satisfying the Taylor principle, finding that the former173
produces lower inflation variability. We focus instead on different contemporaneous interest174
rate rules, assessing the role of the Taylor principle for inflation control. Another important175
difference concerns the experimental design. While in Pfajfar and Z˘akelj (2018) participants176
forecast inflation only, we allow subjects to forecast both inflation and the output gap, in177
accordance with the theoretical NK model. By doing so we do not need to make any specific178
assumption on output gap expectations (as in Pfajfar and Z˘akelj, 2018), thus making sure179
that our results do not hinge on specific hypotheses placed on the belief function for the180
output gap.181
Finally, due to the nature of the strategic environment in the NK model, our paper re-182
lates to the literature that has studied the role of strategic interactions in shaping aggregate183
dynamics. Fehr and Tyran (2008) show by means of laboratory experiments that aggregate184
behavior depends upon the strategic environment. More specifically, strategic complemen-185
tarity leads to large deviations from the aggregate predictions of RE models, while strategic186
substitutability generate outcomes consistent with RE predictions. Our experimental en-187
vironment is more complex than simple univariate systems as it is characterized by two188
endogenous variables, inflation and the output gap, and a policy variable, the interest rate.189
Depending on the policy reaction to inflation fluctuations, the system may exhibit purely190
positive feedbacks or a mixture of positive and negative feedbacks. In earlier LtFEs, Bao191
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et al. (2012) have shown that, within a simple univariate environment with imperfect infor-192
mation, the type of expectations feedback is crucial for convergence to the RE equilibrium.193
In particular, negative feedback experimental markets are rather stable and converge quickly194
to the unique RE steady state. In contrast, positive feedback markets are rather unstable and195
typically do not converge, but fluctuate persistently around the RE steady state. A system196
characterized by positive feedbacks corresponds to a situation in which stated expectations197
are strategic complements, while a system characterized by negative feedbacks corresponds198
to a situation in which stated expectations are strategic substitutes. In our paper we link199
the central bank’s ability to control inflation to the impact that monetary policy has on the200
type of feedback –positive or negative– between expectations and realizations of aggregate201
variables. Positive (negative) expectations feedback means that the average forecast has a202
positive (negative) effect on the realized aggregate variable.203
More specifically in the context of the NK model, we can distinguish different monetary204
policy regimes according to i) whether the Taylor principle is satisfied and ii) the implied205
nature of expectations feedbacks in the economy described by Eq. (4). The IS curve in Eq. (1)206
implies that higher expected output gap leads to higher realized output gap. Moreover, since207
current inflation depends positively on current output gap, the NKPC in Eq. (2) implies208
that both higher expected inflation and higher expected output gap lead to higher realized209
inflation.6 On the other hand, the linkage between expected future inflation and realized210
output depends on the monetary policy defined in Eq (3). In particular, if φpi < 1/ρ then211
the system described by Eq. (4) exhibits purely positive feedbacks. If instead φpi > 1/ρ, then212
the system in Eq. (4) exhibits a mix of positive and negative feedbacks.7 The only source213
of negative feedback in the NK is the monetary policy rule: when the nominal interest rate214
reacts aggressively enough to inflation, i.e. φpi > 1/ρ, then high (low) inflation expectations215
lead to a negative (positive) effect on output gap through real interest rate.8 We can therefore216
6Hence, the signs of ∂yt/∂y¯
e
t+1 (M11 entry of M), ∂pit/∂y¯
e
t+1 (M21 entry of M) and ∂pit/∂p¯i
e
t+1 (M22 entry
of M) are positive and independent of monetary policy.
7In fact, if φpi < 1/ρ then ∂yt/∂p¯i
e
t+1 > 0 and all entries of matrix M are positive. While if φpi > 1/ρ,
then ∂yt/∂p¯i
e
t+1 < 0.
8Notice that the threshold value 1/ρ is larger than 1 since parameter 0 < ρ < 1 denotes the time discount
factor. We remark that a higher reaction coefficient φpi also weakens the existing positive feedbacks since
all positive entries of matrix M are monotonically decreasing, though rather flat, functions of φpi. Given the
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identify three qualitatively different policy regimes. In the first regime (φpi ≤ 1) the Taylor217
principle is not satisfied and the economy exhibits purely positive feedbacks. In the second218
regime (1 < φpi < 1/ρ) the monetary policy rule satisfies the Taylor principle but the model219
is still characterized by purely positive feedbacks. In the third regime (φpi > 1/ρ) the Taylor220
principle is satisfied and the system presents a mix of positive and negative feedbacks. As221
described below, we experiment with different parameterization of the policy rule in Eq. (3)222
belonging to these different policy regimes.223
We show that convergence to the FS-RE equilibrium depends on the strength of nega-224
tive feedbacks introduced in the system by monetary policy via the effect of interest rate225
on aggregate demand. Interestingly, Cornand and Heinemann (2018) show that, in a NK226
model with RE, monetary policy affects strategic uncertainty, turning pricing decisions into227
strategic substitutes when the Taylor principle is satisfied.228
3. Experiment229
In our Learning-to-Forecast experiment subjects are asked to predict inflation and the230
output gap. These forecasts are then used to compute subsequent realizations according to231
the NK model described in Section 2, with structural parameters set as in Clarida et al.232
(2000), i.e. ρ = 0.99, ϕ = 1 and λ = 0.3. The inflation target is set at p¯i = 2%, while233
the natural interest rate is set at γ = 4%. Shock gt and ut are independent and normally234
distributed, with mean 0 and standard deviation 0.1. Before describing the experiment in235
more detail, we first discuss the treatments implemented in our LtFE.236
3.1. Treatments237
The treatments implemented in the experiment are motivated by the theoretical results238
on qualitatively different policy regimes described in Section 2. There are four treatments,239
differing only in the reaction coefficient φpi of the interest rate rule describing monetary240
policy. By analyzing the experimental results in the four treatments we will be able to241
investigate both the role of the Taylor principle and of the “size” of the negative feedback242
assumed parameterization, M11 ∈ [0.77, 0.69], M21 ∈ [0.23, 0.21], and M22 ∈ [0.99, 0.90] for φpi ∈ [1, 1.5].
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in stabilizing our economy. Table 1 summarizes the different treatments implemented in the243
experiment.244
[Insert Table 1 here]245
In the first treatment T1 the policy rule coefficient is set to φpi = 1. Monetary policy246
in T1 belongs therefore to the regime in which the Taylor principle is not satisfied and the247
system exhibits purely positive feedbacks. With φpi = 1 the determinant of matrix I −M248
is zero, implying a continuum of constant stable solutions so that the FS-RE equilibrium249
is not unique.9 Moreover, when φpi = 1, the eigenvalues |λ1| < |λ2| of M−1 are such that250
|λ1| = 1 and |λ2| > 1, so that the NF-RE solution describes unstable equilibrium paths. We251
then consider small perturbations around the threshold case φpi = 1/ρ.
10 In particular, in252
the second treatment T2 the policy rule coefficient is set to φpi = 1.005, while in the third253
treatment T3 the reaction coefficient is set to φpi = 1.015. Treatments T2 and T3 implement254
both a policy regime in which the Taylor principle is satisfied. They, however, differ in terms255
of the type of feedback. In T2 the economy exhibits positive feedback only, while in T3 it256
shows a mix of positive and negative feedbacks. Note that by comparing the outcomes of T1257
vs. T2, both characterized by purely positive feedback, we can assess whether a monetary258
policy rule satisfying the Taylor principle is a necessary and sufficient condition to ensure259
convergence (if any) to the unique FS-RE equilibrium. While, by comparing the outcomes260
in T2 vs. T3, characterized by purely positive feedback and a mix of positive and negative261
feedback respectively, we can determine whether the mere presence of negative feedbacks is262
enough to ensure convergence (if any) to the unique FS-RE equilibrium. Finally, the last263
treatment T4 considers the policy parameter originally proposed by Taylor, i.e. φpi = 1.5.264
Treatments T3 and T4 belong to the same policy regime, with the difference between T3 and265
T4 being the size of the negative feedback. The feedback from expected inflation to realized266
output ∂yt/∂p¯i
e
t+1 is a decreasing function of φpi, so that the higher φpi the more negative267
∂yt/∂p¯i
e
t+1. By comparing the outcomes in T3 vs. T4 we can determine whether convergence268
(if any) to the FS-RE depends on the size of the negative feedback. Finally, note that, under269
9Note that Det(I −M) = λϕ(φpi− 1)/(1 +λϕφpi). Given that ϕ, λ and φpi are positive coefficients, when
φpi = 1 then Det(I −M) = 0. On the contrary, whenever φpi 6= 1, matrix I −M is invertible.
10Note that 1/ρ is approximately 1.01 given the calibrated value of the time discount factor ρ = 0.99.
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RE the FS and NF solutions depend solely on whether the Taylor principle is satisfied or270
not, while the nature of expectations feedback plays no role.271
3.2. Procedures and implementation272
The design of the experiment is a between-subjects design with within session randomiza-273
tion. At the beginning of each session, all participants are divided into groups (experimental274
economies) of six. Subjects only interact with other subjects in their experimental economy,275
without knowing who they are. Subjects are assigned the fictitious role of professional fore-276
casters and they are asked to forecast inflation and the output gap. The average forecasts277
of all subjects in each economy are then used to calculate the realizations of inflation and278
output gap according to the NK model in Section 2. In each period t subjects make forecasts279
for period t + 1. Their information set (visualized on their screen as numbers and partly280
also in graphs) is composed of: all realizations of inflation, output gap, and interest rate281
up to period t− 1, their own forecasts of inflation and output gap up to period t and their282
scores indicating how close their past forecasts were to realized values up to period t− 1.11283
Contemporaneous realizations of the small IID shocks are not observable. Moreover, the284
noise series used in the model equations differed across groups within each treatment, but285
the sets of noise series used in the four treatments were the same. Fig. B.7 in Appendix B286
displays the computer interface as visualized by the participants in the experiment.287
Subjects’ rewards depend on their forecasting performance. At the end of the experi-288
ment it is randomly determined whether a participant is paid for inflation or output gap289
forecasting. The final scores for inflation and output gap forecasting are given by the sums290
of the respective forecasting scores over all periods. The score of subject i for e.g. inflation291
forecast in period t is computed as 100/(1+ |piei,t−pit|), where piei,t denotes subject i’s forecast292
for period t and pit realized inflation in period t (the score is computed in the same way for293
the output gap). Therefore rewards decrease with the distance of the realizations from their294
forecasts. In the instructions, subjects receive a qualitative description of the economy that295
includes an explanation of the mechanisms that govern the model equations, but they do296
11Since the information set of subjects in each period t includes realizations up to period t− 1, forecasts
for period t+ 1 are actually two-period-ahead forecasts.
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not have quantitative information on the exact values of structural parameters, nor on the297
inflation target p¯i.12 The complete instructions can be found in Appendix A.298
The experiment has been programmed in Java and conducted at the CREED laboratory299
at the University of Amsterdam. The experiment was conducted with 144 subjects (6 groups300
of 6 subjects for each of the 4 treatments). After each session, participants filled out a short301
questionnaire. Participants were primarily undergraduate students and the average age302
was slightly below 22 years. About half of the participants were female, about 60% were303
majoring in economics or business, and about 20% were Dutch. During the experiment,304
participants earned “points” according to the forecasting score mentioned above. Points305
were then exchanged for euros at the end of each session at an exchange rate of 0.75 euros306
per 100 points. The experiment lasted around 2 hours, and the average earning was about307
25 euros.308
3.3. Results309
Fig. 1 presents an overview of the experimental results. Each line depicts realized inflation310
(left panels) and output gap (right panels) in a single experimental economy throughout the311
50 periods of the experiment. The dashed lines refer to the constant equilibrium level p¯i and312
(1 − ρ)p¯i/λ respectively for inflation and the output gap. Before describing the results in313
more detail, we note that, for practical reasons, we imposed bounds on the forecasts that314
subjects could input in the computer program. In particular the upper and lower bounds315
for both inflation and the output gap were respectively +100% and -100%, thus not very316
restrictive. Subjects were not informed ex-ante about these bounds and a pop-up message317
would appear on their screens only in case their forecasts were outside the allowed range.318
We interpret scenarios in which these constraints were binding as laboratory evidence of319
the possibility of subjects’ coordination on explosive paths. The erratic behavior typically320
observed in experimental economies after subjects reach these bounds is not very meaningful321
from an economic point of view. Complete data for all groups separately including individual322
12Given that our experiment is a two-period-ahead LtFE, after reading the instructions subjects are
asked to enter forecasts for periods 1 and 2 simultaneously. Subjects therefore receive some indication of
reasonable values by being told in the instructions that, in economies similar to the one they are participating
in, inflation has historically been between −5% and 15% and the output gap between −5% and 5%.
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forecasts can be found in Appendix C.323
[Insert Fig. 1 here]324
The first row of Fig. 1 displays realized inflation and output gap in treatment T1. Inflation325
and the output gap never converge to the equilibrium defined by the target p¯i. This is not326
necessarily surprising since the FS-RE is indeterminate in T1. In four out of six economies327
(groups 2, 4, 5 and 6) we observe explosive dynamics, with inflation forecasts rising to328
the upper bound on allowed forecasts. Reversal of the trend in these economies typically329
occurs when participants reach this upper bound.13 As mentioned before, the ensuing large330
oscillations do not have a clear economic interpretation. We note that in these economies the331
output gap does not explode immediately with inflation. In fact, the impact of real interest332
rate on output is close to zero since φpi = 1. On the other hand, when the upward trend in333
inflation is reversed and deflationary spirals occur, the nominal interest rate hits the ZLB and334
the economy enters a severe recession. In one economy (group 3) we observe convergence to335
a non-fundamental steady state, while in another (group 1) we observe slow oscillations away336
from the target equilibrium.14 The second row of Fig. 1 shows the dynamics of inflation and337
the output gap in treatment T2. Although the Taylor principle is satisfied, we only observe338
convergence to the unique FS-RE equilibrium in one economy out of six (group 3). All other339
groups do not converge to the FS-RE equilibrium. One economy (group 2) converges to an340
almost self-fulfilling stable equilibrium (see Hommes, 2013). The latter is characterized by341
coordination of expectations around a constant value which, although mathematically not a342
steady state, is hardly distinguishable from an equilibrium due to an eigenvalue very close to343
1 and the presence of exogenous disturbances. Three out of six economies (groups 4, 5 and344
6) display the same explosive behavior observed in treatment T1, while one economy (group345
1) is characterized by sustained oscillatory behavior away from steady state. The third row346
of Fig. 1 presents aggregate dynamics in treatment T3. Strikingly, the mere presence of a347
13In treatment T1 group 6 the upward trend in inflation is interrupted due to one participant who
predicted -100% in the attempt to reverse the trend. Given that inflation rose to about 40% before this
event, we consider it as evidence of explosive behavior.
14In treatment T1 group 1, a participant committed a typing error swapping inflation and output gap
forecasts. This caused an interruption of the upward trend in inflation. We conjecture that, without the
typing error, group 1 would have also experienced explosive dynamics.
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small negative feedback eliminates coordination of subjects on unstable paths. In fact, we do348
not observe explosive dynamics in any of the experimental economies. Instead, all economies349
oscillate much closer to target when compared to treatments T1 and T2, with the exception350
of one economy (group 6) which stabilizes on an almost self-fulfilling equilibrium after about351
30 periods of oscillatory behavior. Finally, the last row of Fig. 1 presents the results for352
treatment T4. The difference with all other treatments is remarkable: all experimental353
economies converge to the unique FS-RE equilibrium.354
In what follows we investigate further differences between treatments. As argued in355
Section 3.1, by comparing the outcomes of T1 vs. T2 we can test whether the Taylor principle356
is a necessary and sufficient condition to ensure convergence to the unique FS-RE equilibrium.357
To this end, we compute the mean squared deviations (MSE) of inflation and the output gap358
from the target equilibrium in both T1 and T2 and perform a Wilcoxon rank-sum test.15359
According to the standard NK theory on inflation control, one would expect a significant360
difference between the two treatments, since monetary policy in T2 does satisfy the Taylor361
principle. The test does not reject the null that MSE in T1 is equal to MSE in T2 for both362
inflation and the output gap (p-values equal to 0.47 and 0.65 respectively), confirming the363
graphical evidence presented in Fig. 1 that the Taylor principle is not a sufficient condition364
for convergence to the FS-RE equilibrium.16 We then compare experimental outcomes in T2365
vs. T3 to assess whether by simply adding small negative feedbacks in the system, monetary366
policy can ensure convergence to the target. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test rejects the null of367
equal MSE for the output gap in T2 and T3 (p-value equal to 0.01), though the result is not as368
clear-cut for inflation (p-value equal to 0.06). Although aggregate dynamics are much closer369
to target in T3 when compared to T1 and T2, the presence of negative feedbacks in the system370
is not a sufficient condition for convergence to the FS-RE equilibrium. The Wilcoxon signed-371
rank test rejects the null that average inflation in T3 is equal to target (p-value equal to 0.03),372
while it does not reject it for the output gap (p-value equal to 0.09).17 Finally, we compare373
15In all treatments’ comparisons we allow for an initial learning phase and consider data starting from
period 15.
16Strictly speaking, the Wilcoxon rank-sum test tests the null-hypothesis that the distribution does not
change against the alternative that it shifts between treatments.
17Technically, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test tests the null hypothesis that the distribution of average
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T3 vs. T4 to verify whether convergence to the FS-RE depends on the strength of negative374
feedbacks. Realizations of aggregate variables in treatment T4 are clearly centered around375
the FS-RE equilibrium. This is largely confirmed by a Wilcoxon signed-rank test (p-values376
equal to 0.44 and 0.69 respectively for inflation and the output gap). We therefore conclude377
that, for the FS-RE equilibrium to emerge as the unique outcome, not only monetary policy378
has to satisfy the Taylor principle, but the negative feedback introduced in the system by379
the interest rate rule has to be strong enough. Moreover, the Wilcoxon rank-sum test rejects380
the null of equal MSE for inflation in T3 and T4 (p-value 0.001), while it does not reject it381
for the output gap (p-value 0.15).382
4. Monetary policy and self-organization of expectations383
The experimental economies presented in Section 3.3 show different types of aggregate384
behavior, namely explosive dynamics, persistent oscillations and convergence to (some) equi-385
librium. The goal of this section is to characterize individual forecasting behavior using a386
simple behavioral model of learning and explain the emergence of different aggregate patterns387
depending on monetary policy.388
4.1. Heuristics switching model of expectation formation389
The fact that different types of aggregate behavior arise in our experiments, both within390
and between treatments, suggests that heterogeneous expectations play an important role391
in determining aggregate outcomes. A first result emerging from the analysis of individual392
forecasts is that subjects tend to coordinate on a common prediction strategy, although par-393
ticipants in different groups may coordinate on different strategies. Coordination is, however,394
not perfect and heterogeneity in individual forecasts within groups persists throughout the395
experiment (see Appendix C). Another interesting result that emerges from experimental396
data is that individual forecasting behavior entails a learning process taking the form of397
switching from one prediction strategy to another (see Appendix D).398
In light of this empirical evidence we use a heuristics switching model (HSM), which399
features evolutionary selection among different forecasting strategies, to characterize expec-400
inflation or output gap is centered around the target.
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tations dynamics and explain emergent aggregate behavior. Denoting by H a set of H401
forecasting heuristics for variable x, aggregate expectations in each period t are given by402
a weighted average of the forecasts resulting from these heuristics. In the context of the403
NK model x denotes either inflation or the output gap. The key ingredient of the model is404
that the weight of each heuristic h ∈ H evolves over time as a function of past forecasting405
performance. In particular the measure of past performance of heuristic h denoted as Uh is406
defined as407
Uh,t−1 = F (xt−1 − xeh,t−1) + ηUh,t−2 , (7)408
where F is a generic function of the forecast error of heuristic h, and 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 is a memory409
parameter measuring the relative weight attached to past errors of heuristic h. Performance410
uniquely depends on the most recent forecasting error when η = 0, while it is determined411
by all past prediction errors with exponentially declining weights when 0 < η < 1, or equal412
weights when η = 1. Given the performance measure in Eq. (7), the weight attached to each413
heuristic h at time t is defined as414
nh,t = δnh,t−1 + (1− δ)exp(βUh,t−1)
Zt−1
, (8)415
where Zt−1 =
∑H
h=1 exp(βUh,t−1) is a normalization factor. Parameter 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 describes416
inertia in the evolution of weights, while parameter β ≥ 0 represents the intensity of choice,417
measuring the sensitivity to differences in heuristics performances. The model described by418
Eqs. (7)–(8) has been developed by Anufriev and Hommes (2012), along the lines of Brock419
and Hommes (1997), to explain different types of aggregate behavior as well as individual420
expectations in the asset pricing LtFE of Hommes et al. (2005).18 The model is also related to421
reinforcement learning models developed in game-theoretical frameworks, (see e.g. Camerer422
and Ho, 1999), and to rational inattention models, (see e.g. Mateˇjka and McKay, 2015).423
In order to use the HSM for policy analysis, specific assumptions have to be made about424
18In the original approach of Brock and Hommes (1997) the individual heuristics’ choice in each period
is random, with probability of selecting predictor h given by Eq. (8) with δ = 0. With a continuum of
agents and independent decisions Eq. (8) gives the proportion of agents using heuristics h. Given that each
experimental economy consists of a small number of subjects, we interpret the weights in Eq. (8) as the
weights attributed by subjects to different forecasting rules.
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the forecast error function F and the types of forecasting heuristics to include in set H. In425
our implementation of the model we use the same forecast error function used to incentivize426
subjects in the experiment, i.e. F (x − xe) = 100/(1 + |xe − x|). Moreover, we discipline427
the choice of the set of heuristics H using experimental data. In particular, we consider428
heuristics describing qualitatively different types of forecasting behavior emerging from data429
on individual predictions. We restrict our attention to a set of four heuristics described in430
Table 2. Details on the analysis of individual forecasts time series are given in Appendix E.431
[Insert Table 2 here]432
The parameterization of the heuristics in Table 2 follows Anufriev and Hommes (2012)433
and it is consistent with estimated values using our experimental data (see Appendix E).434
Based upon the calibration in their paper, we set the model parameters β = 0.4, η = 0.7,435
δ = 0.9.19 We adopt therefore the same 4-type HSM that has successfully been used by436
Anufriev and Hommes (2012) to explain different price patterns emerged in the asset pricing437
experiment of Hommes et al. (2005). This illustrates the robustness of the HSM across438
different experimental settings.439
As shown in Appendix F, different homogeneous expectations models, i.e. economies440
where all subjects use one of the forecasting heuristics in Table 2 to predict inflation and441
the output gap, can explain different observed patterns in aggregate variables. For example,442
coordination on forecasting rules strongly extrapolating past trends (STR) leads to explosive443
dynamics under all considered policy regimes, while coordination on adaptive rules (ADA)444
has a stabilizing effect under all considered policy regimes. However, homogeneous expecta-445
tions models do not answer the question why coordination on certain prediction strategies446
emerge under different policy regimes. Our goal is to explain why subjects coordinate on a447
certain forecasting rule depending on monetary policy and how this leads to the emergence448
of different aggregate behavior.449
19We remark that the model is not very sensitive to these parameter values (see also Anufriev and Hommes,
2012), and for different choices of the coefficients of the four heuristics in Table 2 we obtain similar results
to those presented in Section 4.2.
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4.2. Self-organization of heterogeneous expectations450
In this section we discuss the performance of the HSM in describing experimental results451
and illustrate how the model explains the emergence of different aggregate behaviors. For452
each group, we compute one-step-ahead predictions of the HSM described in Section 4.1, and453
then compare them with experimental outcomes. Simulations are initialized using the first454
two realizations for inflation and the output gap, i.e. {pi1, y1} and {pi2, y2}, with equal initial455
weights nh = 1/4 for all heuristics. Using equal weights for periods 3 and 4 and the heuristics456
forecasts, we compute {pi3, y3} and {pi4, y4}. Starting from period 5 dynamics are well defined457
and HSM forecasts are obtained using the same information available to subjects in the458
experiment. Table 3 reports the mean squared prediction errors averaged across groups in459
each treatment. We remark that simulations were truncated whenever bounds on individual460
predictions were reached or subjects tried to strategically reverse explosive trends.20461
[Insert Table 3 here]462
The results show that the HSM is a better predictor than any of the four heuristics alone in463
almost all cases. The only exceptions are the unstable economies in T1 and T2 in which the464
strong trend-following rule performs better in predicting the explosive behavior of aggregate465
variables. In fact, although the HSM encompasses the STR prediction strategy, the weights466
of the four rules are updated with some inertia due to a positive δ and a finite intensity of467
choice β. This result suggests that in situation of high instability, subjects coordinate faster,468
i.e. δ → 0 and β →∞, on forecasting rules that strongly extrapolate observed trends. The469
relatively high MSE registered for all models regarding output gap expectations in T2 is due470
to predictions of one participants in group 5 which, before hitting the upper bound in period471
9, were consistently above the average of all other predictions (almost four times higher on472
average). Removing this one subject from the sample yields much lower MSE values but it473
does not change the models’ ranking in terms of predicting power.474
Figs. 2–4 illustrate how the HSM explains the emergence of different aggregate behaviors475
20In particular, groups 2, 4, 5, and 6 in T1 were simulated respectively until periods 19, 25, 22, and 18,
while groups 1, 4, 5, and 6 in T2 were simulated respectively until periods 11, 11, 9, and 21. Removing these
groups from the sample does not change our qualitative results, though the level of MSE in T1 and T2 is
obviously much lower when unstable economies are not considered in the analysis.
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observed in the experiment, namely explosive dynamics, persistent oscillations and conver-476
gence to (some) equilibrium. Fig. 2 refers to group 4 in T1 as an example of explosive dynam-477
ics, Fig. 3 refers to group 5 in T3 as an example of persistent oscillations, while Fig. 4 refers478
to group 2 in T4 as an example of convergence to equilibrium. Results for other economies479
displaying the same type of aggregate behavior are qualitatively similar (see Figs. G.23–G.34480
in Appendix G reporting results for all experimental economies). Left panels in Figs. 2–4481
display experimental data together with the one-step-ahead predictions under the HSM.482
Overall, the one-step-ahed forecasts closely track experimental data and the model is able to483
reproduce qualitatively all different types of aggregate behavior.21 Right panels in Figs. 2–4484
depict the evolution over time of the weights of the four considered heuristics. In different485
groups different heuristics gain more weight after starting from a uniform distribution. In486
fact, the evolutionary learning process described by the HSM self-organizes into coordination487
on one of the four rules, which then determine (long-run) aggregate behavior.488
[Insert Fig. 2 here]489
In treatment T1 group 4 (Fig. 2) inflation follows an upward trend in the early stage of the490
experiment, triggering increasing coordination on trend-following behavior. The increasing491
trend in inflation is amplified by coordination on the STR forecasting rule, whose weight492
reaches about 90% by the end of the simulation. As noted in Section 3.3, the output gap493
does not explode immediately with inflation because the impact of real interest rate on494
output is close to zero when φpi = 1. Therefore, as long as the output gap remains stable,495
the weights of the four heuristics are similar. However, the sharp increase of the output gap496
towards the end of the considered time period, caused by rising inflation expectations, leads497
to increasing coordination on the STR rule. The emergence of explosive dynamics is thus498
explained by coordination of individual expectations on forecasting strategies that strongly499
extrapolate trends observed in the data. This behavior is consistent with the theoretical500
benchmark derived under homogeneous STR expectations in T1, i.e. explosive dynamics due501
to real eigenvalues outside the unit circle (see Appendix F for details).502
21We also test for the null hypothesis of equality between observed and simulated mean and standard
deviation of inflation and output gap using a Wilcoxon rank-sum test. In all cases we never reject the null
using a 5% significance level.
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[Insert Fig. 3 here]503
In treatment T3 group 5 (Fig. 3) aggregate dynamics are characterized by persistent oscil-504
lations. The HSM explains sustained oscillatory behavior by coordination of most agents on505
a LAA rule. The observed trends in inflation and the output gap in the beginning of the506
experiment cause an initial coordination on trend-following behavior. However, reversal of507
the trend favors the LAA rule in the evolutionary competition among heuristics. In fact,508
in the presence of cyclical oscillations, the purely extrapolative rules WTF and STF tend509
to overshoot the trend reversal. On the other hand, the LAA rule uses an anchor which510
is given by a weighted average of the sample mean and the last observation, thus making511
smaller forecast errors at the turning points of the trend. For both inflation and the output512
gap, the LAA rule dominates reaching a peak weight of about 90% towards the end of the513
experiment, which slowly decreases afterwards as the amplitude of oscillations decreases in514
the last few periods. Oscillatory non-explosive behavior is consistent with the theoretical515
benchmark derived under homogeneous LAA expectations in T3, i.e. sustained non-explosive516
oscillations due to stable complex eigenvalues close to the unit circle (see Appendix F for517
details).518
[Insert Fig. 4 here]519
In treatment T4 group 2 (Fig. 4) dynamics converge to the FS-RE equilibrium. The initial520
part of the experiment is characterized by coordination on the LAA forecasting rule due to521
the continuous reversal of trends in aggregate variables. However, as oscillations gradually522
dampen, the weight of the ADA rule gradually increases. In fact, adaptive rules perform523
better in converging paths as they do not extrapolate past trends in observed variables. Con-524
vergence with progressively dampened oscillations is consistent with the theoretical bench-525
mark derived under homogeneous ADA expectations in T4, i.e. oscillatory convergence due526
to complex eigenvalues within the unit circle (see Appendix F for details).527
The one-step-ahead simulations show that initially heterogenous expectations tend to528
self-organize on common predictions strategies. A salient result is that the proportion of529
agents using (strong) trend extrapolation rules plays an important role for the stability of530
aggregate variables. Groups in which the weight of STR rules is lower are more stable than531
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groups with a higher impact of trend following behavior. Instead, having more agents that532
follow adaptive expectations has a stabilizing effect on aggregate dynamics, while oscillatory533
behavior is associated with anchoring and adjustment heuristics.22 In the following section534
we discuss how monetary policy can influence the process of self-organization of expectations,535
preventing coordination on destabilizing trend-following behavior and ensuring convergence536
to the FS-RE equilibrium.537
4.3. Managing coordination on trend-following behavior through monetary policy538
All experimental economies start away from, typically above, the target equilibrium.23539
By its impact on the feedback between expectations and realizations of aggregate variables,540
monetary policy can influence the adjustment process towards the target. In simple uni-541
variate systems, a positive feedback between expectations and realizations implies that the542
latter move together, so that deviations from equilibrium in one direction provide incentives543
to deviate in the same direction. On the contrary, in negative feedback systems, deviations544
of expectations from equilibrium in one direction have an impact on the endogenous variable545
going in the opposite direction. Previous experimental literature has shown that, in univari-546
ate markets with imperfect information, subjects are able to learn the unique RE equilibrium547
in negative feedback systems but do not converge to it in positive feedback systems. The548
NK model is different from simple univariate frameworks where the nature of expectations549
feedback is uniquely defined, i.e. either positive or negative. In fact, depending on monetary550
policy, the system can be characterized by either purely positive feedbacks or by a mix of551
positive and negative feedbacks. When the NK model exhibits purely positive feedbacks552
(treatments T1 and T2), indeterminacy arises because monetary policy is not able to cor-553
rect drifts in expectations which may become self-sustaining. When the policy rule reacts554
aggressively enough to inflation, it introduces a negative feedback in the system (treatments555
22Interestingly, Pfajfar and Z˘akelj (2018) reach a similar conclusion and note that a higher proportion of
trend extrapolation increases the standard deviation of inflation while having more agents behaving according
to adaptive expectations decreases the standard deviation of inflation.
23This is due to the fact that at the beginning of the experiment, when no realizations of aggregate
variables are observed yet, forecasts tend to cluster around the midpoint of the interval of historical values
given to subjects in the instructions. In the experiment the midpoints of these intervals are 5% and 0%
respectively for inflation and the output gap.
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T3 and T4), which has a stabilizing effect through the impact of real interest rate on ag-556
gregate demand. In order to appreciate the stabilizing effect of this negative feedback, it is557
instructive to look at cross-correlations, reported in Figs. 5–6, among realized and expected558
aggregate variables in the experiment. Note that in Figs. 5–6, the notation p¯ie and y¯e refers559
to expectations formed in period t about inflation and the output gap in t + 1, so that560
e.g. corr(y, p¯ie) refers to correlation between yt and p¯i
e
t+1.561
Fig. 5 displays cross-correlations at different leads and lags, averaged across groups, for562
treatments T1 and T2 characterized by purely positive feedbacks.563
[Insert Fig. 5 here]564
From Fig. 5(a), the first thing that one notices is that correlations are positive across the565
board. For example, correlation between realized inflation (output gap) and expected future566
inflation (output gap) is positive not only contemporaneously, but also at several leads/lags.567
Autocorrelations of expected inflation (output gap) are also positive for several lags. In fact,568
initial trends in aggregate variables are never reversed due to the absence of target rates569
stabilization through monetary policy. In particular, the positive correlation between the570
output gap and expected inflation (corr(y, p¯ie) > 0) implies that there is no reduction in the571
output gap, via real interest rate, when inflation expectations are above target because the572
nominal interest rate does not react enough to inflation. Absent the correction mechanism573
of expectations via monetary policy, deviations from the target are either reinforced by574
coordination on forecasting rules that extrapolate the direction of change, hence resulting575
in explosive paths (see Fig. 2), or they stabilize around one of the multiple steady states.576
Results are very similar in treatment T2 as correlations in Fig. 5(b) are generally positive577
across variables. In fact, even if the Taylor principle is satisfied, the system exhibits purely578
positive feedbacks. Drifts in expectations away from the target are, in general, not corrected579
towards the FS-RE equilibrium and dynamics may either explode or converge to an almost580
self-fulfilling equilibrium.24581
Fig. 6 shows cross-correlations for treatments T3 and T4, characterized instead by a582
mix of positive and negative feedbacks. We first discuss results for treatment T4 and then583
24There is only one experimental economy that oscillates around the target equilibrium in T2.
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examine treatment T3.584
[Insert Fig. 6 here]585
From Fig. 6(b), it is clear that the presence of negative feedbacks in the system significantly586
changes the correlation structure among variables when compared to treatments T1 and587
T2. As in other treatments, initial inflation expectations above target cause realized infla-588
tion to be above target as well. In this case, however, the marked reaction of the nominal589
interest rate causes an increase in the real interest rate so that the output gap decreases590
(corr(y, p¯ie) < 0), curbing therefore the inflationary pressure. Output gap expectations fol-591
low the decreasing trend in the output gap (corr(y, y¯e+1) > 0), further reducing inflation and592
subsequently inflation expectations (corr(y¯e, p¯ie+1) > 0). Decreasing inflation and output gap593
expectations cause inflation to fall and eventually overshoot the target. This leads to lower594
real interest rate which in turn stimulates aggregate demand. This continuous trend reversal,595
driven by the effect of monetary policy on aggregate demand, is reflected e.g. in the observed596
negative autocorrelation of output gap expectations after the first lag (corr(y¯e, y¯ei ) < 0 for597
i < −1). In this environment destabilizing trend-following strategies perform poorly, and598
they are driven out by stabilizing adaptive expectations in the evolutionary competition599
among predictors (see Fig. 4). As the weight of trend-following strategies decreases, oscilla-600
tions in aggregate variables progressively dampen and the system eventually converges to the601
FS-RE equilibrium. In treatment T3 the policy reaction does introduce negative feedbacks602
in the system, which is reflected in the negative correlation between expected inflation and603
current output (corr(y, p¯ie) < 0) in Fig. 6(a). In fact, as in treatment T4, we do observe604
reversal of initial trends in inflation via the impact of real interest rate on aggregate de-605
mand, so that coordination on forecasting strategies that strongly extrapolate past trends606
is prevented (see Fig. 3). However, the impact on aggregate demand is not strong enough607
to quickly revert drifts in inflation expectations. In fact, although output gap expectations608
follow the decreasing trend in the output gap due to inflation expectations above target609
(corr(y, y¯e+1) > 0), their impact on realized inflation is mild, so that inflation expectations610
may still increase despite a negative trend in output gap expectations (corr(y¯e, p¯ie+1) < 0). In611
other words, the signals that subjects receive are not strong enough to promptly correct their612
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expectations. The sluggish dynamics observed in treatment T3 are reflected in the observed613
positive autocorrelation of e.g. output gap expectations until the third lag (corr(y¯e, y¯ei ) > 0614
for −4 < i < 0).615
How can monetary policy manage the self-organization process of expectations and ensure616
determinacy of the FS-RE equilibrium? Our results show that, in the presence of imperfect617
information, obeying the Taylor principle does not necessarily lead to convergence to the618
target. In fact, even if monetary policy reacts more than point-to-point to inflation, the NK619
model may still exhibit purely positive feedbacks. Results from treatment T2 show that in620
such an environment, when a majority of individuals use a trend-following strategy, other621
individuals have an incentive to use such strategy too, thus reinforcing trends in aggregate622
variables. An insight emerging from our analysis is that the introduction of negative feed-623
backs via monetary policy is a necessary condition to prevent coordination on trend-following624
behavior. However, the mere presence of negative feedbacks is not sufficient for the FS-RE to625
emerge as the unique outcome in the experimental economies, as shown in treatment T3. To626
ensure convergence to the desired equilibrium, monetary policy has to be aggressive enough627
to quickly correct drifts in expectations towards the target. How aggressive should then628
monetary policy be to control inflation? It is important to note that, as long as matrix M,629
mapping expectations into realizations of aggregate variables, is close to having an eigenvalue630
equal to 1, the system exhibits sluggish adjustment dynamics and it may converge to almost631
self-fulfilling equilibria. This is in fact the case for treatment T3, in which the absolute value632
of largest eigenvalue is about 0.98. For subjects to learn the FS-RE equilibrium from data633
generated by the economic system, the eigenvalues of matrix M have to be well within the634
unit circle. Results from treatment T4 suggest that a reaction coefficient φpi = 1.5, leading635
to a largest eigenvalue of about 0.83, is sufficient to ensure convergence to the target.636
5. Conclusions637
Laboratory experiments have been used in this paper to test the New Keynesian theory of638
inflation determination. Our results suggest that the Taylor principle does not ensure conver-639
gence to the inflation target. Using a behavioral model of expectation formation, we explain640
how different aggregate outcomes emerge out of a self-organization process of heterogenous641
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expectations driven by their relative forecasting performance. We illustrate how monetary642
policy can prevent coordination on explosive non-fundamental equilibria and steer expecta-643
tions towards the target. In particular, by introducing a strong enough negative feedback644
between expected inflation and aggregate demand, the central bank can avoid coordina-645
tion on trend-following behavior and prevent expectation errors from becoming (partially)646
self-fulfilling.647
Our experiment focuses on short-run forecasts. However, recent literature on forward648
guidance about future central bank actions has highlighted the importance of expectations649
at far horizons for inflation control. Future experiments within NK economies should also650
incorporate elicitation of long-run forecasts. Moreover, our study focuses on an heuristic651
switching model of expectation formation. Recent works have proposed several alternative652
models of expectations within the NK framework, see e.g. least-squares learning (Evans653
and McGough, 2018), sticky information (Mankiw and Reis, 2002), sparsity-based bounded654
rationality (Gabaix, 2018), rational inattention (Mac´kowiak and Wiederholt, 2015), reflective655
equilibrium (Garc´ıa-Schmidt and Woodford, 2015), level-k thinking (Farhi and Werning,656
2017), and imperfect information (Angeletos and Lian, 2018) among others.657
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Tables and figures745
Table 1: Summary of policy regimes and characteristics of RE solutions in different treatments
Treatment φpi Taylor principle Expectations feedbacks FS NF
T1 1 No Purely Positive Indeterminate Explosive
T2 1.005 Yes Purely Positive Unique Explosive
T3 1.015 Yes Mix Positive/Negative Unique Explosive
T4 1.5 Yes Mix Positive/Negative Unique Explosive
Table 2: Set of heuristics
ADA adaptive rule xe1,t+1 = 0.65xt−1 + 0.35x
e
1,t
WTR weak trend-following rule xe2,t+1 = xt−1 + 0.4(xt−1 − xt−2)
STR strong trend-following rule xe3,t+1 = xt−1 + 1.3(xt−1 − xt−2)
LAA anchoring and adjustment rule xe4,t+1 = 0.5(x¯t−1 + xt−1) + (xt−1 − xt−2)
Note: The term x¯t−1 denotes the average of all observations up to time t− 1.
Table 3: MSE of one-step-ahead simulations for different models of expectation formation
Treatment T1 Treatment T2 Treatment T3 Treatment T4
pi y pi y pi y pi y
HSM 3.410 0.098 5.851 8.886 0.714 0.425 0.070 0.083
ADA 61.700 0.323 47.989 18.917 4.350 1.009 0.371 0.482
WTR 19.168 0.152 12.149 10.608 1.586 0.524 0.091 0.149
STR 1.161 0.133 3.599 4.579 2.049 0.690 0.212 0.349
LAA 58.794 0.271 30.221 12.992 2.355 0.559 0.195 0.110
Note: The MSE is computed over periods 5 to 49 in order to minimize the impacts of initial conditions on
heuristics’ weights and of “ending effects” in individual forecasts observed in several groups.
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Figure 1: Inflation (left panels) and output gap (right panels) dynamics in different groups and
treatments. Each line refers to one experimental economy, numbered from 1 to 6.
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Figure 2: Realized and simulated inflation and output gap (left panels) with corresponding weights
of 4 heuristics for T1 group 4. In the left panels, blue circles refer to experimental data while red
squares refer to simulated data. In the right panels, ADA, WTR, STR and LAA refer respectively to
the adaptive rule, the weak trend-following rule, the strong trend-following rule and the anchoring
and adjustment rule.
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Figure 3: Realized and simulated inflation and output gap (left panels) with corresponding weights
of 4 heuristics for T3 group 5. In the left panels, blue circles refer to experimental data while red
squares refer to simulated data. In the right panels, ADA, WTR, STR and LAA refer respectively to
the adaptive rule, the weak trend-following rule, the strong trend-following rule and the anchoring
and adjustment rule.
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Figure 4: Realized and simulated inflation and output gap (left panels) with corresponding weights
of 4 heuristics for T4 group 2. In the left panels, blue circles refer to experimental data while red
squares refer to simulated data. In the right panels, ADA, WTR, STR and LAA refer respectively to
the adaptive rule, the weak trend-following rule, the strong trend-following rule and the anchoring
and adjustment rule.
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Figure 5: Correlations in experimental data – Purely positive feedbacks.
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Figure 6: Correlations in experimental data – Mix positive/negative feedbacks.
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	 1	
Instructions		Welcome	to	this	experiment!	The	experiment	is	anonymous,	the	data	from	your	choices	will	only	be	linked	to	your	station	ID,	not	to	your	name.	You	will	be	paid	privately	at	the	end,	after	all	participants	have	finished	the	experiment.	After	the	main	part	of	the	experiment	and	before	the	payment	you	will	be	asked	to	fill	out	a	short	questionnaire.	On	your	desk	you	will	find	a	calculator	and	scratch	paper,	which	you	can	use	during	the	experiment.		
During	the	experiment	you	are	not	allowed	to	use	your	mobile	phone.	You	
are	also	not	allowed	to	communicate	with	other	participants.	If	you	have	a	
question	 at	 any	 time,	 please	 raise	 your	 hand	 and	 someone	 will	 come	 to	
your	desk.		General	information	and	experimental	economy	All	 participants	will	 be	 randomly	 divided	 into	 groups	 of	 six	 people.	 The	 group	composition	 will	 not	 change	 during	 the	 experiment.	 You	 and	 all	 other	participants	will	take	the	roles	of	statistical	research	bureaus	making	predictions	of	inflation	and	the	so-called	”output	gap”.	The	experiment	consists	of	50	periods	in	total.	In	each	period	you	will	be	asked	to	predict	inflation	and	output	gap	for	the	next	period.		The	economy	you	are	participating	 in	 is	described	by	 three	variables:	 inflation	𝜋! ,	 output	 gap	𝑦!	and	 interest	 rate	𝑖! .	 The	 subscript	 t	 indicates	 the	 period	 the	experiment	 is	 in.	 In	 total	 there	 are	 50	 periods,	 so	 t	 increases	 during	 the	experiment	from	1	to	50.	Inflation	Inflation	measures	 the	percentage	change	 in	 the	price	 level	of	 the	economy.	 In	each	 period,	 inflation	 depends	 on	 inflation	 predictions	 and	 output	 gap	predictions	 of	 the	 statistical	 research	 bureaus	 in	 the	 economy	 (a	 group	 of	 six	participants	 in	 this	 experiment)	 and	 on	 a	 random	 term.	 There	 is	 a	 positive	relation	 between	 the	 actual	 inflation	 and	 both	 inflation	 predictions	 and	 actual	output	 gap.	 This	 means	 for	 example	 that	 if	 the	 inflation	 predictions	 of	 the	research	 bureaus	 increase,	 then	 actual	 inflation	 will	 also	 increase	 (everything	else	 equal).	 In	 economies	 similar	 to	 this	 one,	 inflation	 has	 historically	 been	between	−5%	and	15%.	Output	gap	The	output	gap	measures	the	percentage	difference	between	the	Gross	Domestic	Product	(GDP)	and	the	natural	GDP.	The	GDP	is	the	value	of	all	goods	produced	during	 a	 period	 in	 the	 economy.	 The	 natural	 GDP	 is	 the	 value	 the	 total	production	would	have	if	prices	in	the	economy	were	fully	flexible.	If	the	output	gap	is	positive	(negative),	the	economy	therefore	produces	more	(less)	than	the	natural	GDP.	In	each	period	the	output	gap	depends	on	inflation	predictions	and	output	 gap	predictions	 of	 the	 statistical	 bureaus,	 on	 the	 interest	 rate	 and	on	 a	
748
39
	 2	
random	term.	There	is	a	positive	relation	between	the	output	gap	and	inflation	predictions	and	also	between	the	output	gap	and	output	gap	predictions.	There	is	a	negative	relation	between	the	output	gap	and	the	interest	rate.	In	economies	similar	to	this	one,	the	output	gap	has	historically	been	between	-5%	and	5%.	Interest	Rate	The	interest	rate	measures	the	price	of	borrowing	money	and	is	determined	by	the	central	bank.	If	the	central	bank	wants	to	increase	inflation	or	output	gap	it	decreases	 the	 interest	 rate,	 if	 it	 wants	 to	 decrease	 inflation	 or	 output	 gap	 it	increases	the	interest	rate.		Prediction	task	
Your	 task	 in	 each	 period	 of	 the	 experiment	 is	 to	 predict	 inflation	 and	
output	 gap	 in	 the	 next	 period.	When	 the	 experiment	 starts,	 you	 have	 to	
predict	inflation	and	output	gap	for	the	first	two	periods,	i.e.	𝝅𝟏𝒆 	and	𝝅𝟐𝒆 ,	and	𝒚𝟏𝒆 	and	𝒚𝟐𝒆 .	 The	 superscript	 e	 indicates	 that	 these	 are	 predictions.	 When	 all	participants	 have	 made	 their	 predictions	 for	 the	 first	 two	 periods,	 the	 actual	inflation	(𝜋!),	the	actual	output	gap	(𝑦!)	and	the	interest	rate	(𝑖!)	for	period	1	are	announced.	 Then	 period	 2	 of	 the	 experiment	 begins.	 In	 period	 2	 you	 make	inflation	 and	 output	 gap	 predictions	 for	 period	 3	 (𝜋!! 	and	𝑦!! ).	 When	 all	participants	have	made	their	predictions	for	period	3,	inflation	(𝜋!),	output	gap	(𝑦!),	and	interest	rate	(𝑖!)	for	period	2	are	announced.	This	process	repeats	itself	for	50	periods.		Thus,	in	a	certain	period	t	when	you	make	predictions	of	inflation	and	output	gap	in	period	t	+	1,	the	following	information	is	available	to	you:		• Values	of	actual	inflation,	output	gap	and	interest	rate	up	to	period	t	−	1;		• Your	predictions	up	to	period	t;		• Your	prediction	scores	up	to	period	t	−	1.			Payments	
Your	payment	will	depend	on	the	accuracy	of	your	predictions.	You	will	be	
paid	 either	 for	 predicting	 inflation	 or	 for	 predicting	 the	 output	 gap.	 The	accuracy	of	your	predictions	is	measured	by	the	absolute	distance	between	your	prediction	and	the	actual	values	(this	distance	is	the	prediction	error).	For	each	period	the	prediction	error	is	calculated	as	soon	as	the	actual	values	are	known;	you	 subsequently	 get	 a	prediction	 score	 that	decreases	 as	 the	prediction	error	increases.	The	 table	below	gives	 the	 relation	between	 the	prediction	error	and	the	 prediction	 score.	 The	 prediction	 error	 is	 calculated	 in	 the	 same	 way	 for	inflation	and	output	gap.	
Prediction	error	 0	 1	 2	 3	 4	 9	Score	 100	 50	 33.33	 25	 20	 10	
749
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Example:	If	(for	a	certain	period)	you	predict	an	inflation	of	2%,	and	the	actual	inflation	turns	out	to	be	3%,	then	you	make	an	absolute	error	of	3%	−	2%	=	1%.	Therefore	you	get	a	prediction	score	of	50.	If	you	predict	an	inflation	of	1%,	and	the	actual	inflation	turns	out	to	be	negative	2%	(i.e.	-2%),	you	make	a	prediction	error	of	1%	−	(−2%)	=	3%.	Then	you	get	a	prediction	score	of	25.	For	a	perfect	prediction,	with	a	prediction	error	of	zero,	you	get	a	prediction	score	of	100.		The	 figure	 below	 shows	 the	 relation	 between	 your	 prediction	 score	 (vertical	axis)	and	your	prediction	error	(horizontal	axis).	Points	in	the	graph	correspond	to	the	prediction	scores	in	the	previous	table.		
		At	 the	 end	 of	 the	 experiment,	 you	will	 have	 two	 total	 scores,	 one	 for	 inflation	predictions	and	one	for	output	gap	predictions.	These	total	scores	simply	consist	of	the	sum	of	all	prediction	scores	you	got	during	the	experiment,	separately	for	inflation	and	output	gap	predictions.	When	the	experiment	has	ended,	one	of	
the	two	total	scores	will	be	randomly	selected	for	payment.		
Your	 final	 payment	 will	 consist	 of	 0.75	 euro	 for	 each	 100	 points	 in	 the	
selected	 total	 score	 (200	points	 therefore	 equals	 1.50	 euro).	 This	will	 be	
the	only	payment	from	this	experiment,	i.e.	you	will	not	receive	a	show-up	
fee	on	top	of	it.	
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Computer	interface	The	computer	interface	will	be	mainly	self-explanatory.	The	top	right	part	of	the	screen	will	 show	you	all	of	 the	 information	available	up	 to	 the	period	 that	you	are	in	(in	period	t,	i.e.	when	you	are	asked	to	make	your	prediction	for	period	t	+	
1,	this	will	be	actual	inflation,	output	gap,	and	interest	rate	until	period	t	–	1,	your	predictions	 until	 period	 t,	 and	 the	 prediction	 scores	 arising	 from	 your	predictions	until	period	t	–	1	 for	both	inflation	(I)	and	output	gap	(O)).	The	top	left	part	of	the	screen	will	show	you	the	information	on	inflation	and	output	gap	in	 graphs.	 The	 axis	 of	 a	 graph	 shows	 values	 in	 percentage	 points	 (i.e.	 3	corresponds	 to	3%).	Note	 that	 the	 values	 on	 the	 vertical	 axes	may	 change	
during	the	experiment	and	that	they	are	different	between	the	two	graphs	
–	the	values	will	be	such	that	it	is	comfortable	for	you	to	read	the	graphs.	Next	to	each	graph,	you	will	find	an	input	box	for	your	predictions.		On	 top	 of	 the	 inflation	 graph	 you	 are	 asked	 to	 enter	 your	 prediction	 for	
inflation.		At	the	bottom	of	the	output	gap	graph	you	are	asked	to	enter	your	prediction	for	the	output	gap.	In	 the	 bottom	 left	 part	 of	 the	 screen	 you	will	 find	 a	Submit	 button,	 to	 submit	your	predictions.	When	 submitting	 your	 prediction,	 use	 a	 decimal	 point	 if	
necessary	(not	a	comma).	For	example,	if	you	want	to	submit	a	prediction	
of	2.5%	type	”2.5”;	for	a	prediction	of	−1.75%	type	”	−1.75”.	The	sum	of	the	prediction	scores	over	the	different	periods	are	shown	in	the	bottom	right	of	the	screen,	separately	for	your	inflation	and	output	gap	predictions.			At	the	bottom	of	the	screen	there	is	a	status	bar	telling	you	when	you	can	enter	your	predictions	and	when	you	have	to	wait	for	other	participants.		
751
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Appendix B. Computer interface752
Figure B.7: Screenshot of computer interface.
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Appendix C. Summary of all experimental data by group753
Figs. C.8–C.15 show the realizations and forecasts of inflation and output gap. Each754
graph corresponds to one group of six people. The solid black line shows the realization of755
inflation (left panels) and the output gap (right panels), while the different markers show the756
forecasts of the six individuals in the group. For some experimental economies, for which757
dynamics were not very visible in the plot range (−100,+100), we report a zoom over a758
smaller interval in the inset graphs.759
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Figure C.8: Realizations and forecasts of inflation (left panels) and the output gap (right panels)
for T1 (groups 1–3).
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Figure C.9: Realizations and forecasts of inflation (left panels) and the output gap (right panels)
for T1 (groups 4–6).
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Figure C.10: Realizations and forecasts of inflation (left panels) and the output gap (right panels)
for T2 (groups 1–3).
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Figure C.11: Realizations and forecasts of inflation (left panels) and the output gap (right panels)
for T2 (groups 4–6).
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Figure C.12: Realizations and forecasts of inflation (left panels) and the output gap (right panels)
for T3 (groups 1–3).
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Figure C.13: Realizations and forecasts of inflation (left panels) and the output gap (right panels)
for T3 (groups 4–6).
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Figure C.14: Realizations and forecasts of inflation (left panels) and the output gap (right panels)
for T4 (groups 1–3).
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Figure C.15: Realizations and forecasts of inflation (left panels) and the output gap (right panels)
for T4 (groups 4–6).
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Figs. C.8–C.15 show that subjects tend to coordinate on a common prediction strategy,760
although participants in different groups may coordinate on different strategies. In order761
to quantify coordination on a common prediction strategy we consider, for each group, the762
average individual quadratic forecast error763
1
6× 36
6∑
i=1
50∑
t=15
(xei,t − xt)2 ,764
defined as the individual quadratic forecast error averaged over time and over participants765
within a group. Note that we consider observations from period 15 on to allow for an initial766
learning phase. In the context of the NK model, x refers to either inflation or the output767
gap. Defining x¯ei,t =
∑6
i=1 x
e
i,t as the average prediction in a group, we can decompose the768
average individual quadratic forecast error as follows769
1
6× 36
6∑
i=1
50∑
t=15
(xei,t − xt)2 =
1
6× 36
6∑
i=1
50∑
t=15
(xei,t − x¯et )2 +
1
36
50∑
t=15
(x¯et − xt)2 . (C.1)770
The first term on the RHS of Eq. (C.1) measures the dispersion among individual predic-771
tions as the quadratic distance between individual and average prediction within each group,772
averaged over time and participants. This term equals 0 when all participants in a group use773
exactly the same forecasting strategy. Therefore this term measures deviation from coordi-774
nation on a common prediction strategy. The second term on the RHS of Eq. (C.1) measures775
instead the average distance between average forecast x¯et and realization xt. Fig. C.16 reports,776
for each of the 6 groups in the 4 treatments, the decomposition of the average quadratic fore-777
cast error into average dispersion and average common error.25 From inspection of Fig. C.16778
it is clear that only a relatively small part of the average quadratic forecasting error can779
be explained by the dispersion in expectations. In fact, on average respectively 68% and780
72% of the average quadratic forecast error in inflation and output gap can be attributed781
to the average common error. Overall, the decomposition of the average quadratic forecast782
25In order to avoid the big impact that outliers have on the measure of dispersion in individual forecasts,
e.g. when bounds on individual predictions were reached or subjects tried to strategically reverse explosive
trends, we remove them using linear interpolation of neighboring, non-outlier values. Outliers are defined as
observations more than three MAD from the local median defined over a window of 4 observations.
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Figure C.16: Decomposition of average quadratic forecast error of individual prediction strategies
into average dispersion error and average common error for each of the 6 groups in the 4 treatments.
error suggests that there is coordination on a common prediction strategy, although some783
heterogeneity in individual forecasts persists.784
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Appendix D. Switching behavior785
Evidence of switching behavior can be found by inspecting the time series of individual786
forecasts. Fig. D.17 reports some graphical evidence of individual switching behavior. For787
every period t we plot realized inflation or output gap in that period, together with the788
prediction submitted by subjects in period t + 1. In this way we can graphically infer how789
individual predictions use past available observations of the variable being forecasted. For790
example, if the time series coincide, the participant is submitting predictions identical to the791
last observation.792
In Fig. D.17(a) (treatment T4, group 2), subject 12 extrapolates the direction of change793
in inflation in the early stage of the experiment. Starting from about period 20 the partici-794
pant switches to a much weaker form of trend extrapolation, to later on adopt an adaptive795
forecasting strategy in which individual forecasts are somewhere in between the last available796
observation and the previous prediction.797
In Fig. D.17(b) (treatment T4, group 2), we observe a somewhat similar forecasting798
behavior as subject 11 strongly extrapolates past changes in the output gap in the first half799
of the experiment. In the second half the participant switches to an adaptive forecasting800
heuristic.801
In Fig. D.17(c) (treatment T3, group 6), subject 7 switches between various constant802
predictors for inflation in the first 20 periods of the experimental session. Later on the803
participant converges to a predictor of about 8%, which represents an almost self-fulfilling804
equilibrium for the experimental economy.805
In Fig. D.17(d) (treatment T3, group 6), subject 12 starts out with a trend extrapolating806
strategy and later on switches to a “naive” forecasting rule that basically uses the last807
available observation to predict future output gap.808
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Figure D.17: Individual learning as switching between heuristics. For every period t, subject i’s
prediction xei,t+2 and the last available observation of the variable xt being forecasted (with x being
either inflation or the output gap) are reported.
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Appendix E. Estimation of forecasting rules809
In what follows we only consider experimental economies in which expectations did not810
reach the artificial bounds on admissible forecasts. Accordingly, we exclude from the sample811
groups 2, 4, 5 and 6 in T1 and groups 4, 5, and 6 in T2. In all analyses performed below,812
we consider a significance level of 0.05. For each of the 102 participants in the considered813
subsample we estimated linear prediction rules of the form814
piej,t+1 = c+
2∑
i=0
αeipi
e
j,t−i +
3∑
i=1
αpii pit−i +
3∑
i=1
αyi yt−i + ξt (E.1)815
yej,t+1 = c+
2∑
i=0
αeiy
e
j,t−i +
3∑
i=1
αyi yt−i +
3∑
i=1
αpii pit−i + t , (E.2)816
where piej,t+1 and y
e
j,t+1 refer to inflation or output gap forecast of participant j for period817
t + 1 (submitted in period t). We allow for an initial learning phase, in which subjects818
may have not yet converged to a prediction rule and still be experimenting with different819
strategies, by considering observations starting from period 15.26 Overall, for about 65% of820
the estimated rules we do not detect any first-order autocorrelation in the residuals according821
to a Breusch-Godfrey test. Moreover, in about 75% of the cases an F−test indicates that822
we can restrict rules (E.1)–(E.2) to simpler rules in which predictions depend only on past823
forecasts and past observations of the forecasting objective. Averaging over participants824
of all treatments, the number of significant regressors in the estimated prediction rules is825
about 2. The most popular significant regressor is the last available observation of the826
forecasting objective (pit−1 or yt−1), followed by the second last available observation pit−2 for827
Eq. (E.1) and by the most recent own prediction yet for Eq. (E.2). Looking at the estimated828
coefficients, a remarkable property is that 100% of the significant coefficients associated to829
the last observed forecasting objective and about 90% of the significant coefficients associated830
to the most recent own prediction are positive. In contrast, about 92% of the significant831
coefficients associated to the second last observed forecasting objective are negative.832
26We remove outliers in individual forecasts using linear interpolation of neighboring, non-outlier values.
Outliers are defined as observations more than three MAD from the local median defined over a window of
4 observations.
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Overall, the estimation results indicate that most participants use a linear prediction833
rule, at least after an initial learning phase. What is more, the fact that the two latest834
observations of the forecasting objective and the latest own prediction are generally the most835
used prediction rule components, implies that these variables are of particular importance in836
the prediction rule specification. The relatively low average number of significant regressors837
in Eqs. (E.1)–(E.2) means that the other variables are used very little as input to form838
predictions. It is therefore worthwhile to restrict specifications (E.1)–(E.2) by leaving out839
these infrequently used regressors. The fact that the estimated non-zero coefficients for the840
most recent values of the forecasting objective and the own prediction are almost all positive,841
while the non-zero coefficients of the other variables tend to be negative, similarly suggests842
that the specifications (E.1)–(E.2) are too flexible and could be restricted without losing843
much explanatory power. Restricting (E.1)–(E.2) along the lines of these regularities could844
increase the efficiency of the estimates, as well as make the estimated rules easier to interpret845
from a behavioral viewpoint.846
In particular, we perform an F−test to check whether we could restrict the general847
forecasting rules in Eqs. (E.1)–(E.2) to simpler prediction rules of the form848
piej,t+1 = α1pit−1 + α2pi
e
j,t + (1− α1 − α2)
1
35
50∑
t=15
pit + α3(pit−1 − pit−2) + ξt (E.3)849
yej,t+1 = α1yt−1 + α2y
e
j,t + (1− α1 − α2)
1
35
50∑
t=15
yt + α3(yt−1 − yt−2) + t . (E.4)850
Forecasting rules (E.3)–(E.4) are referred to as First-Order Heuristics (FOH) and can be851
interpreted as anchoring-and-adjustment heuristics a` la Tversky and Kahneman. The first852
three terms in (E.3) and (E.4) are a weighted average of the latest realization of the fore-853
casting objective, the latest own prediction and the forecasting objective’s sample mean854
(excluding a learning phase).27 This weighted average is the (time varying) “anchor” of the855
prediction, which is a zeroth-order extrapolation from the available data at period t. The856
27In the estimation of (E.3) and (E.4) we include the sample mean of inflation and the output gap,
which is of course not available to the subjects at the moment of the prediction, but acts as a proxy of
the equilibrium level. In the HSM of Section 4.1, the LAA rule uses sample average up to t − 1, which is
observable to subjects when the forecast is made and generally converges quickly to the full sample mean.
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fourth term in (E.3) and (E.4) is a simple first-order extrapolation from the two most recent857
realizations of the forecasting objective; this term is the “adjustment” or trend extrapolation858
part of the heuristic. An advantage of FOH is that it simplifies to well-known forecasting859
rules for different boundary values of the parameter space. For example, Eqs. (E.3)–(E.4)860
reduce to Naive Expectations if α1 = 1, α2 = α3 = 0; they reduce to Adaptive Expectations861
if α1 + α2 = 1 (with α1, α2 ∈ (0, 1)) and α3 = 0 (ADA rule considered in Section 4.1);862
they reduce to the simplest Trend-Following rule if α1 = 1, α2 = 0 and α3 > 0 (WTR863
and STR rules considered in Section 4.1). When 0 < α1 < 1, α2 = 0 and α3 = 1, with864
the sample average computed using observations up to period t − 1, we obtain an Anchor-865
ing and Adjustment rule with a time-varying anchor (LAA rule considered in Section 4.1).866
Overall, about 66% of the general forecasting rules (E.1)–(E.2) could be restricted to FOH867
rules (E.3)–(E.4) according to an F−test. In about 54% of the cases we do not detect any868
first-order autocorrelation in the residuals according to a Breusch-Godfrey test. Moreover,869
about 53% of the estimated rules could be exactly restricted to one of the types considered870
in Section 4.1, while the others present different anchor–adjustment combinations within the871
classes defined in Eqs. (E.3)–(E.4). Fig. E.18 reports estimates of the FOH coefficients in872
Eqs. (E.3)–(E.4).873
Figure E.18: Left panel: estimated coefficients of rules classified as Adaptive (squares), Trend-
Following (diamonds) and Anchoring and Adjustment (circles). Right panel: estimated coefficients
of rules with different anchor–adjustment combinations.
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Appendix F. Homogeneous expectations models874
In this section we analyze the stability properties of the NK model in Eq. (4) under875
homogeneous expectations, i.e. when all participants in the economy use the same forecasting876
heuristic. In particular, we study the deterministic skeleton of model (4), i.e. setting the noise877
term t to zero, under the homogeneous expectations presented in Table 2 in different policy878
regimes.879
Adaptive heuristics880
Under adaptive expectations for both inflation and the output gap we can write the881
vector of expected future aggregate variables ze = (ye, pie)′ as882
zet+1 = χzt−1 + (1− χ)zet , (F.1)883
where scalar 0 < χ < 1 denotes the relative weight of past observations. Rewriting the NK884
model in Eq. (4) as885
zet+1 = −M−1A + M−1zt . (F.2)886
Substituting Eq. (F.2) lagged one period in Eq. (F.1) we can write zet+1 as function of zt−1887
zet+1 = −(1− χ) M−1A + (χ I + (1− χ) M−1)zt−1 , (F.3)888
where I denotes the identity matrix. Substituting Eq. (F.3) in the NK model (4) we obtain889
zt = χA + (χM + (1− χ) I)zt−1 . (F.4)890
The dynamic properties of the NK model under homogeneous adaptive expectations are891
described by Eq. (F.4). Simple calculations show that the unique steady state of system (F.4)892
is the FS-RE equilibrium z¯ = (I − M)−1A, provided that matrix (I − M) is invertible,893
i.e. φpi > 1. Stability of the FS-RE equilibrium under adaptive expectations depends on the894
eigenvalues of matrix χM+(1−χ) I. Fig. F.19 displays the absolute value of the eigenvalues895
of matrix χM + (1 − χ) I as function of parameter χ under policy regimes implemented in896
different treatments. In treatment T1 one eigenvalue is always on the unit circle so that897
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Figure F.19: Absolute value of eigenvalues of matrix χM + (1 − χ) I as function of χ. Dashed
vertical lines refer to ADA rule (χ = 0.65).
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the steady state of Eq. (F.4) is indeterminate and there is a continuum of stable steady898
states. In treatments T2, T3 and T4 the FS-RE steady state is stable for all values of χ.899
Convergence under homogeneous adaptive expectations is monotonic in T2 and T3 due to900
real eigenvalues and oscillatory in T4 due to complex eigenvalues.901
Trend-following heuristics902
Under trend-following heuristics for both inflation and the output gap we can write the903
vector of expected future aggregate variables ze = (ye, pie)′ as904
zet+1 = zt−1 + ξ(zt−1 − zt−2) , (F.5)905
where scalar ξ > 0 denotes the degree of trend-extrapolation. Under expectations defined in906
Eq. (F.5) the NK model can be rewritten as907
zt = A + M (1 + ξ)zt−1 − ξ zt−2 . (F.6)908
Defining wt = zt−1 we can rewrite Eq. (F.6) as a first-order system defined by909 zt
wt
 =
A
0
+
(1 + ξ) M −ξM
I 0
zt−1
wt−1

st = B + N st−1 ,
(F.7)910
where s = (z, w)′. The dynamic properties of the NK model under homogeneous trend-911
following expectations are described by the 4-dimensional system in Eq. (F.7). Simple912
calculations show that the unique steady state of system (F.7) is the FS-RE equilibrium913
z¯ = (I −M)−1A, provided that matrix (I −M) is invertible, i.e. φpi > 1. Stability of the FS-914
RE equilibrium under trend-following expectations depends on the eigenvalues of matrix N915
in Eq. (F.7). Fig. F.20 displays the absolute value of the eigenvalues of matrix N as function916
of parameter ξ under policy regimes of T1, T2, T3 and T4. Under the WTR in Table 2,917
i.e. ξ = 0.4, all eigenvalues are within the unit circle in T2, T3 and T4, meaning that the918
FS-RE steady state is stable (although convergence can be slow in T2 and T3 due to one919
eigenvalue close to one), while in T1 one eigenvalue is exactly on the unit circle, meaning920
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Figure F.20: Absolute value of eigenvalues of matrix N as function of ξ in different treatments.
Dashed vertical lines refer to WTR (ξ = 0.4) and STR (ξ = 1.3).
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that there is a continuum of stable equilibria. On the opposite, the system is unstable under921
the STR in Table 2, i.e. ξ = 1.3, in all treatments with dynamics exploding monotonically in922
treatments T1, T2 and T3 due to the presence of explosive real eigenvalues, and oscillating923
in T4 due to the complex explosive eigenvalues.924
Anchoring and adjustment heuristics925
The anchoring and adjustment heuristic considered in Table 2 for a generic variable x926
has a time-varying component x¯t−1 defined as927
x¯t−1 =
1
t− 1
t−1∑
i=1
xi . (F.8)928
Therefore, under the anchoring and adjustment heuristics for both inflation and the output929
gap we can write the vector of expected future aggregate variables ze = (ye, pie)′ as930
zet+1 =
1
2
z¯t−1 +
3
2
zt−1 − zt−2 . (F.9)931
Substituting Eq. (F.9) in the NK model we obtain932
zt = A + M
(
1
2
z¯t−1 +
3
2
zt−1 − zt−2
)
. (F.10)933
Although it is trivial to show that that the FS-RE equilibrium z¯ = (I−M)−1A is the unique934
steady state of system (F.10), provided that matrix (I −M) is invertible, i.e. φpi > 1, it is935
non-trivial to study its stability properties due to explicit dependence on t. Therefore, we936
replace z¯t−1 with the equilibrium z¯ and study whether small perturbations to the FS-RE937
equilibrium are amplified or re-absorbed. We thus consider the system938
zt = A + M
(
1
2
z¯ +
3
2
zt−1 − zt−2
)
, (F.11)939
64
which can be rewritten, defining wt = zt−1, α = 1/2 z¯, β = 3/2 and β2 = −1, as a 4-940
dimensional system941 zt
wt
 =
A + Mα
0
+
β1M β2M
I 0
zt−1
wt−1

st = B + N st−1 ,
(F.12)942
whose stability depends on the eigenvalues of matrix N. Fig. F.21 depicts the eigenvalues943
of matrix N as function of the policy parameter φpi. When φpi = 1, two complex eigenvalue
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
ϕπ0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
1.05
Figure F.21: Absolute value of eigenvalues of matrix N as function of φpi.
944
are exactly on the unit circle, while the others are within the unit circle, meaning that945
there in T1 there is a continuum of stable equilibria under homogeneous LAA forecasts.946
As φpi increases from 1 to 1.5, eigenvalues move from within to outside the unit circle.947
Therefore, under the policy regimes implemented in treatments T2 and T3, the system is948
stable with homogeneous anchoring and adjustment forecasting heuristics. On the contrary,949
under the policy regime of T4 the system exhibits explosive complex eigenvalues and it is950
therefore unstable. The intuition for this result is the following. Start from equilibrium and951
suppose there is a positive shock in inflation expectations. This will cause actual inflation952
to increase via the NKPC, but at the same time it will lower output via an higher interest953
rate. When the interest rate is aggressive enough, output fluctuations are large and they are954
further amplified by trend-extrapolating LAA rule. This has a negative impact on inflation,955
which can overshoot the target, leading the central bank to lower the interest rate reversing956
65
the trend in the output gap. The combination of strong interest rate reaction and trend957
extrapolation may lead small initial deviations from equilibrium to be amplified over time,958
causing oscillatory divergence. Simulations of system (F.10) with observable sample mean959
z¯t−1 confirm these results and are reported in Fig. F.22 for φpi = 1.015 and φpi = 1.5.28 Notice960
that, in order to initialize system (F.10), we need to set the first two values z1 and z2. We fix961
the initial value at steady state, i.e. (y1, pi1)
′ = ((1 − ρ)p¯i/λ, p¯i), and we define (y2, pi2)′ on a962
grid defined by points y2 = {y1−0.1, y1, y1 + 0.1} and pi2 = {pi1−0.1, pi1, pi1 + 0.1}. Each line
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Figure F.22: Simulated dynamics of inflation (left panels) and output gap (right panels) under
LAA heuristics for φpi = 1.015 (top panels) and φpi = 1.5 (bottom panels).
963
corresponds to simulated dynamics for different initial conditions. When monetary policy964
is not too aggressive the system is stable, although convergence can be very slow due to an965
eigenvalue almost on the unit circle. On the other hand, when the policy reaction is strong,966
28Dynamics for φpi = 1.005 are similar to those obtained for φpi = 1.015
66
the system is unstable displaying oscillatory divergence.967
Appendix G. One-step-ahead simulations for all groups968
In this section we report the results of one-step ahead predictions for all experimental969
economies. Left panels in Figs. G.23–G.34 display experimental data together with the one-970
step-ahead predictions under the HSM, while right panels depict the evolution over time of971
the weights of the four considered heuristics.972
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Figure G.23: Realized and simulated inflation and output gap (left panels) with corresponding
simulated weights of 4 heuristics for T1 (groups 1–2).
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Figure G.24: Realized and simulated inflation and output gap (left panels) with corresponding
simulated weights of 4 heuristics for T1 (groups 3–4).
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Figure G.25: Realized and simulated inflation and output gap (left panels) with corresponding
simulated weights of 4 heuristics for T1 (groups 5–6).
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Figure G.26: Realized and simulated inflation and output gap (left panels) with corresponding
simulated weights of 4 heuristics for T2 (groups 1–2).
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Figure G.27: Realized and simulated inflation and output gap (left panels) with corresponding
simulated weights of 4 heuristics for T2 (groups 3–4).
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Figure G.28: Realized and simulated inflation and output gap (left panels) with corresponding
simulated weights of 4 heuristics for T2 (groups 5–6).
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Figure G.29: Realized and simulated inflation and output gap (left panels) with corresponding
simulated weights of 4 heuristics for T3 (groups 1–2).
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Figure G.30: Realized and simulated inflation and output gap (left panels) with corresponding
simulated weights of 4 heuristics for T3 (groups 3–4).
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Figure G.31: Realized and simulated inflation and output gap (left panels) with corresponding
simulated weights of 4 heuristics for T3 (groups 5–6).
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Figure G.32: Realized and simulated inflation and output gap (left panels) with corresponding
simulated weights of 4 heuristics for T4 (groups 1–2).
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Figure G.33: Realized and simulated inflation and output gap (left panels) with corresponding
simulated weights of 4 heuristics for T4 (groups 3–4).
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Figure G.34: Realized and simulated inflation and output gap (left panels) with corresponding
simulated weights of 4 heuristics for T4 (groups 5–6).
79
